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1 Introduction
The recent collusion theory literature has developed a clear consensus that asymmetries hinder
collusion. For example, this result is robust to whether asymmetries are in terms of firms’
capacity constraints (see Compte et al., 2002; Vasconcelos, 2005; and Bos and Harrington, 2010
and 2015) or the number of di↵erentiated products that each firm sells (see Ku¨hn, 2004). These
papers in particular have been important for merger policy as they have highlighted which types
of mergers can cause coordinated e↵ects, that is, an increased likelihood of tacit collusion post-
merger. More specifically, with respect to capacity constraints, Compte et al. (2002) show that
collusion can be more di cult as the capacity of the largest firm is increased through a merger,
and Vasconcelos (2005) finds that collusion is hindered when the largest firm is larger or when
the smallest firm is smaller. Bos and Harrington (2010) show that increasing the capacity of
medium-sized firms can facilitate collusion, if only a subset of firms in the market are involved
in the collusion.1
In practice, the degree to which firms can monitor each other’s actions plays an important
part in determining whether a merger causes coordinated e↵ects. Yet, all of the papers above
assume there is perfect observability of rivals’ actions, so deviations from the collusive strategies
will be detected immediately. In contrast, many mergers occur in markets in which there is
the potential for secret price cuts. This may be the case, for example, in upstream business-
to-business markets where transaction prices can be unrelated to posted prices. Consequently,
it is inappropriate to consider the e↵ects of such mergers in terms of collusion under perfect
observability. Instead, they should be considered in the context of imperfect monitoring, where
firms are uncertain over whether their rivals have followed their collusive strategies or not (see
Green and Porter, 1984; and Harrington and Skrzypacz, 2007 and 2011). However, while the
models in this literature provide many interesting insights into the sustainability of collusion, it
is di cult to draw implications for merger policy from them, because they analyse collusion with
symmetric firms.
In this paper, we begin to fill this gap in the literature by exploring the e↵ects of asymmetries
in capacity constraints on collusion under imperfect monitoring. We achieve this by extending
Compte et al. (2002) to a setting where there is demand uncertainty and where firms never
directly observe their rivals’ prices or sales. Thus, similar to the imperfect monitoring setting
1Fonseca and Normann (2008) also find that asymmetries in capacity constraints hinder collusion in laboratory
experiments.
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first discussed by Stigler (1964), each firm must monitor the collusive agreement using their
own privately observed sales. In this regard, our model is related to Tirole’s (1988, p.262-264)
model of private monitoring that captures the results of Green and Porter (1984) in a Bertrand
framework (see also Amelio and Biancini, 2010). Yet, unlike Tirole (1988), where there is a chance
in each period that market demand will be zero, in our model market demand is drawn from
an interval, where all possible states of demand are positive. We use this model to investigate
whether collusion is facilitated or hindered as capacity is reallocated among the firms to draw
implications for merger policy.
Using information from their privately observed sales, we show that all firms can always infer
when at least one firm’s sales are below some firm-specific “trigger level”. The optimal trigger
level for each firm is determined by the largest possible sales consistent with them or a rival being
undercut on price. Thus, if all firms set a common price, then all firms’ sales will exceed their
respective trigger levels when the realisation of market demand is high, otherwise they can all
fall below the trigger levels. Yet, if all firms do not set a common price, then the highest-priced
firms will receive sales below their trigger levels and the lower-priced firm(s) can infer this.2
Consequently, we restrict attention to equilibria in public strategies, known as perfect public
equilibria, where firms condition their play upon this public information (i.e. whether all firms’
sales are greater than their trigger levels or not). We show that if fluctuations in market demand
are small, then such strategies ensure monitoring is perfect, because firms will only ever receive
sales below their trigger levels if they are undercut. However, if fluctuations in market demand
are large, then collusive sales will also fall below the trigger levels when the realisation of market
demand is low. This implies, in contrast to Compte et al. (2002), that there is uncertainty as to
whether rivals have followed the collusive strategies or not, so punishment phases must occur on
the equilibrium path to provide firms with the correct incentives to collude.
We solve for an optimal perfect public equilibrium.3 We find that asymmetries hinder col-
lusion whether monitoring is perfect or imperfect. For instance, the critical discount factor is
2Note that this information is common knowledge in our framework, because a deviation by a firm a↵ects the
sales of all of its rivals. In contrast, this information may not be common knowledge in a framework where firms’
products are spatially di↵erentiated, as in the Salop circle, for example, because then firms located next to a
deviator would experience lower sales but other firms may not.
3In the main paper, we use a simple strategy profile, similar to Tirole (1988), where firms revert to the static
Nash equilibrium for a number of periods when they receive a bad signal. In an online appendix, we use the
techniques of Abreu et al. (1986, 1990) to show that this simple approach generates the maximal equilibrium
profits.
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higher when the largest firm is larger and it can be higher when the smallest firm is smaller. The
reason for the former is that the punishment is weaker when the largest firm has more capacity.
The latter is due to the fact that deviations by the smallest firm are most di cult for rivals to
detect, because each rival’s resultant sales are most similar to its collusive sales. Thus, decreasing
the size of the smallest firm can make monitoring more di cult. Another implication of this is
that punishment phases occur more often on the equilibrium path when the smallest firm has
less capacity, and the optimal equilibrium profits are lower as a result. The size of the other
firms’ capacities do not a↵ect the the equilibrium profits or the critical discount factor.
After solving the model, we then use it to draw implications for merger policy. In particu-
lar, we analyse both the coordinated and unilateral e↵ects of mergers in a unified framework.
Unilateral e↵ects arise if a firm has an individual incentive to raise prices post-merger. It is well
understood that unilateral e↵ects are associated with asymmetric post-merger market structures
and coordinated e↵ects are associated with symmetric post-merger market structures (see Ivaldi
et al., 2003a and 2003b). As discussed by Ku¨hn (2001) and Motta et al. (2003), this implies
that there is a tradeo↵ between such e↵ects when the degree of asymmetry in a market is altered
by a merger or divestiture remedy: increasing asymmetries reduces the likelihood of coordinated
e↵ects but raises the likelihood of unilateral e↵ects, and vice versa. However, in the previous
theoretical literature, these e↵ects have been modelled independently of each other. For example,
in the framework of Compte et al. (2002), either the monopoly price is sustainable in every pe-
riod, in which case only coordinated e↵ects matter, or collusion is never sustainable at any price,
so only unilateral e↵ects matter. Consequently, their focus is solely on the coordinated e↵ects
of mergers on the critical discount factor. In contrast, our model allows for a more continuous
treatment of unilateral and coordinated e↵ects, because play can alternate between phases of
collusion and competition on the equilibrium path. As a result, our model is ideal to analyse the
tradeo↵ between coordinated and unilateral e↵ects.
In the framework of Compte et al. (2002), a merger that causes coordinated e↵ects is more
harmful to consumer welfare than compared with an alternative that causes unilateral e↵ects.
The reason is that firms will optimally share the monopoly profits in every future period if collu-
sion is sustainable, so only a merger to monopoly would be equally as bad in terms of unilateral
e↵ects. A similar point is made more generally by Ro¨ller and Mano (2006). They argue that a
merger that disrupts pre-merger collusion, by enhancing the market power of a single firm, should
be pro-competitive because “it is preferable that any coordination is by only a subset of firms
(i.e. the merging parties) rather than all firms (tacitly)” (p.22). However, in contrast to this,
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we show that unilateral e↵ects can be more harmful than coordinated e↵ects. This is due to the
fact that firms are not able to share the monopoly profits under imperfect monitoring, because
punishment phases occur on the equilibrium path. Consequently, a merger that facilitates col-
lusion by distributing capacity symmetrically can be less harmful to consumer welfare than one
that creates a near monopoly.4 We demonstrate that if the fluctuations in market demand are
su ciently large, then the optimal collusive prices of symmetric capacity distributions are lower
on average than the competitive prices of asymmetric capacity distributions. An implication of
this is that it can be appropriate to remedy a merger that causes unilateral e↵ects by imposing
a divestment that creates a symmetric market structure, even if this facilitates collusion under
imperfect monitoring.
Finally, our model is distinct from the previous literature that analyses collusion with capacity
constraints and fluctuations in market demand. The main di↵erence is that our focus is on
mergers, which necessarily requires us to model asymmetries in markets with more than two
firms. In contrast, the focus of this other literature is on pricing over the business cycle. For
instance, Staiger and Wolak (1992) and Knittel and Lepore (2010) endogenise the choice of
capacities in an infinitely repeated game. Despite analysing asymmetric games following the
capacity choice stage, they restrict attention to duopoly. Other di↵erences are that there is
perfect observability and market demand is known when prices are set. In a similar setting
to that just described, Fabra (2006) analyses collusion where firms’ capacity constraints are
exogenous but symmetric.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the assumptions of the
model and solves for the static Nash equilibrium. In section 3, we analyse the repeated game.
We first show that there is some public information that firms can condition their play on, and
find when monitoring is perfect or imperfect. Then we solve the repeated game and analyse
the successfulness of collusion for di↵erent capacity distributions. In section 4, we consider the
implications for merger policy, and section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated to appendix
A. In an online appendix, we use the techniques of Abreu et al. (1986, 1990) to show that
the simple approach used to solve the repeated game in the main text is optimal, in that it
generates the maximal equilibrium profits. We also explore the robustness of our results to two
key assumptions.
4This argument is likely to extend to other models where collusion among asymmetric firms is imperfect.
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2 The Model
2.1 Basic assumptions
Consider a market in which a fixed number of n   2 capacity-constrained firms compete on price
to supply a homogeneous product over an infinite number of periods. Firms’ costs are normalised
to zero and they have a common discount factor,   2 (0, 1). In any period t, firms set prices
simultaneously where pt = {pit,p it} is the vector of prices set in period t, pit is the price of firm
i = {1, . . . , n} and p it is the vector of prices of all of firm i’s rivals. Market demand consists of
a mass of mt (infinitesimally small) buyers, each of whom are willing to buy one unit provided
the price does not exceed their reservation price, which we normalise to 1. We assume that firms
do not observe m⌧ , for all ⌧ 2 {0, . . . , t}, but they know that mt is independently drawn from a
continuous distribution G(m), with mean bm and density g(m) > 0 on the interval [m,m].
Buyers are informed of prices, so they will want to buy from the cheapest firm. However, the
maximum that firm i can supply in any period is ki, where we let kn   kn 1   . . .   k1 > 0,
without loss of generality. We denote total capacity as K ⌘Pi ki and the maximum that firm
i’s rivals can supply in each period as K i ⌘
P
j 6=i kj . In contrast to the buyers, firm i never
observes firm j’s prices, pj⌧ , or sales, sj⌧ , j 6= i, for all ⌧ 2 {0, . . . , t}. Thus, similar to Tirole
(1988), our setting has the feature that all buyers are fully aware of prices, yet all firms are only
aware of their own prices. Such a setting is consistent with a market in which all buyers are
willing to check the prices of every firm in each period to find discounts from posted prices, but
actual transaction prices are never public information.5
2.2 Demand allocation and sales
Following the literature (for example, see Vasconcelos, 2005; and Bos and Harrington, 2010 and
2015), we make the common assumption that demand is allocated by the following rule:
The proportional allocation rule
Unsupplied buyers want to buy from the firm(s) with the lowest price among those with spare
capacity.
• If the joint capacity of such firms is insu cient to supply all of the unsupplied buyers, then
such capacity is exhausted, and the remaining unsupplied buyers now want to purchase
5In contrast to Tirole (1988), our main results hold when enough buyers are informed of prices, if capacity
constraints are binding.
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from the firm(s) with the next lowest price among those with spare capacity, and so on.6
• If the joint capacity of such firms su ces to supply all of the unsupplied buyers, then each
firm supplies an amount of buyers equal to its proportion of the joint capacity.
This allocation rule is commonly considered in the literature in terms of a cartel selecting how
much of the market demand each member supplies. Indeed, there are a number of cartels that
have allocated demand in proportion to each member’s capacity (see the examples in Vascon-
celos, 2005, and Bos and Harrington, 2010). However, this seems inappropriate in our model,
because members of such cartels are likely to have some knowledge of market demand and rivals’
sales when allocating demand, which is not present in our setup. Instead, we have tacit collusion
in mind where firms play no role in the allocation of the market demand, other than through
the prices they set. Thus, in our framework it seems more appropriate to consider the demand
allocation in terms of buyers allocating themselves to firms according to the proportional alloca-
tion rule. While it is possible to conceive of ways in which buyers would allocate themselves in
this manner in certain settings, the main purpose of this assumption is to develop the simplest
conceivable model to compare collusive and non-collusive merger outcomes. However, it should
be noted that the allocation rule is not important for the characterisation of the static Nash
equilibrium. It is also not important for the (qualitative) analysis of the collusive equilibria in
section 3.1 and 3.2. Further discussion is provided in the online appendix, where we consider
how the allocation rule can a↵ect the comparative statics analysis in section 3.3.
We also place the following plausible yet potentially restrictive assumption on the capacity
distribution:
Assumption 1. m   K 1.
This says that the joint capacity of the smallest firm’s rivals should not exceed the minimum
market demand, and it ensures that firm i’s sales in period t are strictly positive, for all i
and all mt > m, even if it is the highest-priced firm. The main purpose of this assumption
is that it greatly simplifies the characterisation of the static Nash equilibrium when there are
more than two asymmetric firms.7 It is a su cient (but not necessary) condition for the static
6Note that we do not need to specify which buyers are supplied, since all consumers have the same reservation
price. In contrast, when consumers’ reservation prices di↵er, the identities of the buyers who are supplied by the
firm has important implications for welfare (see for example Vives, 1999, p.124-6).
7For more details, see Hirata (2009) who characterises the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in a static setting
with three asymmetrically-capacity constrained firms but without demand uncertainty.
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Nash equilibrium profits to be strictly increasing in the capacity of the largest firm, kn, and as
we demonstrate in the online appendix, it is still possible to characterise the optimal collusive
scheme when this assumption is relaxed. To understand the generality of Assumption 1, note
that it is not restrictive if all firms can only ever collectively supply as much as the minimum
market demand, m   K. Otherwise, for a given level of m, there is a restriction on the size
of the smallest firm in that it cannot be too small. Given the smallest firm’s capacity can be
no larger than for a symmetric duopoly, a necessary condition for Assumption 1 to hold is that
the minimum market demand must be greater than 50% of the total capacity, m   0.5K. We
also argue in section 4 that Assumption 1 is not very restrictive in the context of mergers. No
restriction is placed on the level of the maximum market demand, m.
Assumption 1 and the proportional allocation rule together imply that firm i’s sales in period
t, sit(pit,p it;mt), for any pit  1, are given by (1), where ⌦(pit) denotes the set of firms that
price strictly below pit and pmaxt ⌘ max{pt}.
sit (pit,p it;mt) =
8>><>>:
ki if pit < pmaxt
min
⇢
ki
K 
P
j2⌦(pit) kj
⇣
mt  
P
j2⌦(pit) kj
⌘
, ki
 
  0 if pit = pmaxt
(1)
This says that a firm will supply its proportion of the residual demand if it is the highest-priced
firm in the market and if capacity is not exhausted, otherwise it will supply its full capacity. This
implies that firm i’s expected per-period profit is ⇡it (pit,p it) = pit
Rm
m sit (pit,p it;m) g(m)dm,
where we drop time subscripts if there is no ambiguity. Furthermore, we write ⇡i (p) if pj = p  1
for all j, such that:
⇡i (p) =
8>>><>>>:
pki if K  m
pki
⇣RK
m
m
K g(m)dm+
Rm
K g(m)dm
⌘
if m < K < m
pki
bm
K if m  K,
for all i. So, such profits are maximised for pm ⌘ 1.
Finally, an important implication of our assumptions is that a firm will meet all demand up
to its capacity in any given period. This implies that a deviant is not able to attempt to hide
its deviation by limiting the units available at the deviation price. Consequently, our analysis
is likely to be appropriate for markets where collusive prices are set at the senior management
level, but the total output of the firm is determined at a lower level by sales representatives
who are unaware of the collusion. This was the case in many, if not most, detected cartels
(see Harrington, 2006, for evidence from Europe). Nevertheless, we have explored this issue
8
beyond the analysis presented below and can show that our main results are robust to this
alternative setting if deviants are only able to limit their sales below demand to some extent and
if this is more di cult for large firms than smaller firms. This may be the case, for example, if
the senior managers of a deviant firm can only imperfectly limit the total output of their sales
representatives, who are unaware of the collusion, and larger firms have more sales representatives
which makes this task more problematic.8
2.3 Static Nash equilibrium
In this subsection, we analyse the stage game. Consistent with the standard Bertrand-Edgeworth
setting, the static Nash equilibrium can be in pure strategies or mixed strategies. While the proof
of the former is trivial, we extend the equilibrium analysis in Fonseca and Normann (2008) to our
setting of demand uncertainty to solve for the latter. This is also equivalent to the equilibrium
analysis of Gal-Or (1984) if firms are symmetric.
Lemma 1. For any given n   2 and K 1  m:
i) if m   K, then there exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium, with profits ⇡Ni = ki 8 i;
ii) if m < K, then there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, with profits, 8 i:
⇡Ni (kn) =
8<:
ki
kn
⇣RK
m (m K n) g(m)dm+ kn
Rm
K g(m)dm
⌘
if K < m
ki
kn
(bm K n) if m  K. (2)
Competition is not e↵ective if the minimum market demand is above total capacity, m   K, so
firms set pi = 1 in equilibrium and receive ⇡Ni = ki for all i. In contrast, if market demand can
be below total capacity, firms are not guaranteed to supply their full capacity for every level of
demand, so they have incentives to undercut each other. However, by charging pi = 1, firm i
can ensure that its expected per-period profit is at least:
⇡i ⌘
8<:
RK
m (m K i) g(m)dm+ ki
Rm
K g(m)dm if m < K < mbm K i if m  K. (3)
This defines firm i’s minimax payo↵. The intuition is that the firm with strictly the highest price
expects to supply its full capacity if the realisation of market demand exceeds total capacity, but
it expects to supply the residual demand otherwise. It follows from this that the largest firm
will never set a price below p ⌘ ⇡n/kn in an attempt to be the lowest-priced firm. This implies
8This analysis is available from the authors upon request.
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that the smaller firms i < n can sell their full capacity with certainty by charging a price slightly
below p to obtain a profit of kip   ⇡i. Consequently, the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium profits
are given by ⇡Ni (kn) = kip. This is equivalent to (2), where Assumption 1 is su cient to ensure
that these are nonnegative for all i. The lower bound of the support is p.
3 Monitoring with Asymmetries
In this section, we analyse the repeated game. We first show that there is some public information
that firms can condition their play on, and find when monitoring is perfect or imperfect. We
then solve the game and compare the results for alternative capacity distributions. Henceforth,
we impose m < K, as collusion is unnecessary otherwise from Lemma 1.
3.1 Information and monitoring
Under our assumptions, repetitions of the stage game generate private and public information
histories. For instance, the private history of firm i in period t is the sequence of its past prices
and sales, denoted zti ⌘ (pi0, si0; . . . ; pit 1, sit 1). In contrast, a public history is the sequence
of information that is observed by all firms, regardless of their actions. In this subsection, we
show that the fact that each firm observes its own sales implies that all firms will always know
when at least one firm’s sales are below some firm-specific “trigger level”. As we discuss below,
firms can then use public strategies in which they condition their play on this public information.
Formally, let firm i’s trigger level be of the form si (µ) ⌘ kiKµ for all i and consider the history
ht = (y0, y1, . . . , yt 1) where, for all ⌧ = {0, 1, . . . , t  1}:
y⌧ =
8><>:y if si⌧ (pi⌧ ,p i⌧ ;m⌧ ) > si (µ) 8 iy otherwise. (4)
This says that y⌧ = y if all firms’ sales in period ⌧ exceed their trigger levels, but y⌧ = y if at
least one firm’s sales does not.
We wish to establish that ht is a public history if µ   m⇤ (k1,m) ⌘ min
⇢
K(m k1)
K 1 ,K
 
. This
requires that y⌧ is common knowledge for all ⌧ , for any zti . First, suppose si (µ)   ki such that
µ   K for any m > m. For any such case, ht is a public history because the trigger levels are so
high that all firms’ sales can never exceed them for any prices. Hence, y⌧ = y for all ⌧ . Next,
suppose si (µ) 2 [si (m⇤ (k1,m)) , ki) such that µ 2

K(m k1)
K 1 ,K
◆
, which requires m < K. In
this case, it is possible for firms to receive sales above their trigger levels, since si (µ) < ki, but
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each firm’s sales will never do so if the firm has been undercut on price. For instance, for any
nonempty set of rivals with a price strictly below pmax, ⌦ (pmax), the sales of firm j 2 ⌦ (pmax)
are sj = kj and, given m < K, the sales of firm i with pi = pmax  1 are:
si =
ki
⇣
mt  
P
j2⌦(pmax) kj
⌘
K  Pj2⌦(pmax) kj  ki (m  k1)K 1 = si (m⇤ (k1,m))  si (µ) < ki, (5)
from (1). It then follows that ht is a public history for any µ 2

K(m k1)
K 1 ,K
◆
for the following
reasons. If firms set a common price p  1, then either all firms’ sales will exceed their trigger
levels or they all will not. Yet, as has just been demonstrated, if firms do not set such a common
price, then the sales of the highest-priced firms will not exceed their trigger levels, and their
lower-priced rivals will supply their full capacities.9 Any low-priced firm that supplies its full
capacity knows, from (1), that its price is strictly below the highest in the market. Furthermore,
it also knows that this implies that the highest-priced firms’ sales are below their respective
trigger levels. Finally, note that ht is not a public history if si (µ) < si (m
⇤ (k1,m)) for any
m > m. The reason is that firms can receive sales above their trigger levels when firms set a
common price and when they have been undercut on price, from (1). Consequently, if firms
do not set a common price, then a low-priced firm that supplies its full capacity can no longer
infer from its sales whether the sales of the highest-priced firms are below their respective trigger
levels.
The above implies that, for any µ   m⇤ (k1,m), there exists some public information that
allows firms to make inferences about the behaviour of their rivals. In particular, each firm knows
that all firms’ sales will exceed their trigger levels, such that y = y, if pj = p  1 for all j and
if m > µ   m⇤ (k1,m); otherwise, at least one firm’s sales will not exceed its trigger level, so
y = y. It follows from this that if m > m⇤ (k1,m), then firms can perfectly monitor a strategy
in which all firms set a common collusive price. This is due to the fact that each firm would
receive sales below si (m
⇤ (k1,m)) only if it has been undercut. In contrast, if m  m⇤ (k1,m),
then there is imperfect monitoring for any µ   m⇤ (k1,m). The reason can be understood by
considering Pr
 
y|pi,p i
 
which denotes the probability of observing y if firm i sets pi and its
rivals price according to p i. For the case of µ   m⇤ (k1,m)   m:
Pr
 
y|pi,p i
 
=
8<:
Rmin{µ,m}
m g (m) dm 2 [0, 1] if pj = p 8j
1 otherwise.
(6)
9If any firms’ prices are above 1, then they will receive zero sales, which is below their trigger levels. In this
case, only the firms whose prices do not exceed 1 will supply their full capacities.
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This says that a firm’s sales can be below its trigger level if the realisation of market demand is
su ciently low, even when firms set a common price. Thus, for such an outcome colluding firms
face a non-trivial signal extraction problem: each firm does not know whether the realisation of
market demand was unluckily low or whether at least one rival has undercut them.
Proposition 1 finds the conditions for perfect and imperfect monitoring in terms of the max-
imum market demand, holding the minimum market demand constant.
Proposition 1. For any given n   2, K 1  m < K, and   2 (0, 1), there exists a unique
level of market demand, x (k1) ⌘ m + k1
⇣
K m
K
⌘
2 (m,K), such that if m 2 (m,x (k1)), then
monitoring can be perfect. Otherwise, there is imperfect monitoring.
Monitoring can be perfect if the fluctuations in market demand are su ciently small, other-
wise there is imperfect monitoring. The critical level x (k1) is strictly increasing in the capacity
of the smallest firm, k1. The reason is that deviations by the smallest firm are most di cult
to detect, from (5), and it follows from this that detecting a deviation is less di cult when the
smallest firm is larger. Consequently, if it is just possible for a firm to infer that the smallest
firm has not deviated for a given level of m, then it is also possible for the same level of m if the
smallest firm has more capacity. Thus, deviations can be detected perfectly for a wider range of
fluctuations in market demand when the smallest firm is larger.
Finally, we have so far considered the public information that firms can infer from their
privately observed sales. Before moving on, we should discuss two possible scenarios in which
a firm’s sales can provide it with private information that is not common knowledge among all
firms. In either case though, it should be noted that any such private information is not payo↵
relevant if rivals follow public strategies. Thus, it will not be possible for a firm to use its private
information to gain by deviating from an equilibrium in public strategies. The first case is when
a firm knows for sure that it has been undercut. This occurs if firm i’s sales are inconsistent
with all firms setting a common price, si <
ki
Km for some i. Such information is not common
knowledge if monitoring is imperfect, because the deviants j 6= i would be unaware of the specific
levels of its rivals’ sales: they simply know that at least one rival’s sales are below its trigger
level. The second case is when the smallest firm knows for sure that all firms have set a common
price, but its rivals i > 1 are uncertain as to whether the smallest firm has undercut them.
This may occur if firm 1 is strictly the smallest firm and if fluctuations in market demand are
not large, such that m < K. In such a case, the highest possible sales of the smallest firm if
it is undercut are k1K 2 (m  k2) < si (m⇤ (k1,m)). Thus, if the smallest firm’s sales are below
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si (m
⇤ (k1,m)) yet above k1K 2 (m  k2), then it knows for sure that all firms have set a common
price. Nevertheless, the fact that the smallest firm’s sales will be below its trigger level for any
µ   m⇤ (k1,m) will inform it that its rivals’ sales are also below their trigger levels.
3.2 Optimal collusive equilibrium profits
We now solve the repeated game restricting attention to sequential equilibria in public strategies,
in which firms condition their play only on the public history. Such equilibria are known as perfect
public equilibria (PPE) (see Fudenberg and Tirole, 1994, p.187-191). We solve the model using
two seemingly di↵erent approaches. First, in the main body of the paper, we restrict attention to
a particular class of PPE in which, similar to Green and Porter (1984) and Tirole (1988), firms
punish each other by reverting to the static Nash equilibrium for a fixed number of periods, if
they receive a bad signal in a collusive period. The strategy profile for this approach is formally
described below and we refer to it as trigger-sales strategies. Second, given that restricting
attention to trigger-sales strategies leaves open the question of whether there are other PPE
with higher profits, we solve for the set of PPE in the online appendix using the techniques
of Abreu et al. (1986, 1990). This appendix shows that trigger-sales strategies are optimal
equilibrium strategies in that they support the maximal PPE payo↵s and they generate the
lowest critical discount factor.
Trigger-sales strategies are formally defined as follows. There are ‘collusive phases’ and
‘punishment phases’. Suppose period t is in a collusive phase. In any such period, a firm
should set the collusive price, pc > p. If yt = y, such that all firms received sales above their
trigger levels, then the collusive phase continues into the next period t+ 1. If yt = y, such that
at least one firm received sales below its trigger level, then firms enter a punishment phase in the
next period t + 1. In the punishment phase, each firm should play the static Nash equilibrium
for T periods, after which a new collusive phase begins. This sequence repeats in any future
collusive phase.
Denote firm i’s expected (normalised) profit in a collusive phase as kiV c and its expected
(normalised) profit at the start of a punishment phase as kiV p. If all firms follow trigger-sales
strategies, then:
kiV c = (1   )⇡i (pc) +  
⇥ 
1  Pr  y|pc   kiV c + Pr  y|pc  kiV p⇤
kiV p = (1   )
PT 1
t=0  
t⇡Ni (kn) +  
T kiV c,
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for all i, where Pr
 
y|pc  = G (µ) from (6). Substituting kiV p into kiV c and solving yields:
kiV
c = ⇡Ni (kn) +
(1   )
1    +G (µ)   (1   T )
 
⇡i (p
c)  ⇡Ni (kn)
 
, (7)
where it is then straightforward to check that ⇡i (pc)   kiV c > kiV p for any T > 0 and that
kiV p > ⇡Ni (kn) for any T <1.
The profile of trigger-sales strategies is a PPE if, for each date t and any history ht, the
strategies yield a Nash equilibrium from that date on. We say that collusion under trigger-sales
strategies is not sustainable if no such equilibrium strategies exist. Given firms play the static
Nash equilibrium during each period of the punishment phase, it is clear that they have no
incentive to deviate in any such periods. Thus, we need only consider deviations during collusive
phases, in which case Pr
 
y|pi, pc
 
= 1 for any pi 6= pc from (6). The incentive compatibility
constraint (ICC) for any firm i is as follows:
kiV c   (1   ) kipc +  kiV p
 
⇣
1  
1  T
⌘
kipc +  ⇡Ni (kn) .
(8)
This says that firm i will not deviate in any period in a collusive phase if it cannot gain by
marginally undercutting pc > p to supply its full capacity ki.10 Notice for all ⇡i (pc) > ⇡Ni (kn)
that lowering µ towards m⇤ (k1,m) increases kiV c, from (7), and it slackens the ICC in (8).
Consequently, it is optimal for firms to set µ = m⇤ (k1,m), such that the trigger levels are
determined by the largest sales firms i > 1 can make if all such firms set the same price and firm
1 undercuts to sell its full capacity. Then it is easy to check that (8) is never satisfied when the
maximum market demand is greater than total capacity, m   K, because G (m⇤ (k1,m)) = 1
from (6). Thus, collusion under trigger-sales strategies is not sustainable if m   K, so we can
henceforth focus on the case where m < K.
Substituting kiV c into (8), then rearranging yields:
(1 G (m⇤ (k1,m)))K
 
pc   p   (K   bm) pc
 
   T ⇥(1 G (m⇤ (k1,m)))K  pc   p   (K   bm) pc⇤ .
(9)
It follows from the fact that (9) is independent of ki that if the ICC holds for firm i, then it also
holds for all other firms j 6= i. This implies that, under the proportional allocation rule, each firm
has the same incentive to deviate as its rivals despite potential asymmetries. Furthermore, note
10It follows from Lemma 1 that firm i’s optimal deviation is to undercut pc > p for all i. Furthermore, note
that pc > p is a necessary condition for firms to attain collusive profits per-period greater than the static Nash
equilibrium profit.
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that the left-hand side of (9) is strictly less than the expression in square brackets on the right-
hand side for all   < 1. Consequently, (9) can only hold if both are nonnegative, since  T 2 (0, 1]
for all T 2 [0,1). Thus, similar to Green and Porter (1984) and Tirole (1988), it follows from (9)
that there are three necessary conditions for the profile of triggers-sales strategies to be a PPE.
First, the length of the punishment phase must be su ciently long, where the critical duration,
denoted T ⇤ (k1, kn, pc), is implicitly defined by the level of T where (9) holds with equality.11
Second, firms must also be su ciently patient, such that:
    (K   bm) pc
(1 G (m⇤ (k1,m)))K
 
pc   p  ⌘  ⇤ (k1, kn, pc) , (10)
in which case the left-hand side of (9) is nonnegative, such that the ICC holds as T ! 1.
This implies that if firms are not su ciently patient, then even a punishment phase that lasts
an infinite number of periods is insu cient to outweigh the short-term benefit from deviating.
Furthermore, note that the critical punishment phase duration T ⇤ (k1, kn, pc) < 1 for any   >
 ⇤ (k1, kn, pc) and T ⇤ (k1, kn, pc)!1 if   =  ⇤ (k1, kn, pc). Third, the probability of receiving a
bad signal must be su ciently low, where:
G (m⇤ (k1,m)) < 1  (K   bm) pc
K
 
pc   p  , (11)
such that the expression in square brackets in (9) is positive. Note that (11) ensures  ⇤ (k1, kn, pc) <
1, which implies that if this condition is not met, then the firms are not su ciently patient for
any   < 1, even if a punishment phase lasts an infinite number of periods.
Proposition 2 solves for the optimal PPE profits under trigger-sales strategies. We refer to
this as collusion under imperfect monitoring.
Proposition 2. For any given n   2 and K 1  m < K, there exists a unique level of market
demand, x (k1, kn) 2 (x (k1) ,K), that solves G (m⇤ (k1, x (k1, kn))) = K nK < 1, such that, if
m 2 [x (k1) , x (k1, kn)) and if      ⇤ (k1, kn) ⌘ 11 G(m⇤(k1,m)) knK 2
 
kn
K , 1
 
, then firm i’s optimal
PPE profits under trigger-sales strategies are:
kiV
⇤ =
ki
K
✓ bm G (m⇤ (k1,m))K
1 G (m⇤ (k1,m))
◆
2
✓
⇡Ni (kn) ,
ki
K
bm◆ 8 i.
Otherwise, collusion under trigger-sales strategies is not sustainable.
11Although T ⇤ (k1, kn, pc) may not be an integer, the expected punishment phase duration could still equal this
if firms could vary the length of punishment phases using a publicly observable randomisation device.
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This says that, if the necessary conditions (10) and (11) are satisfied, then the optimal PPE
profits under trigger-sales strategies have the firms set the monopoly price during a collusive
phase and the optimal punishment phase duration is T ⇤ (k1, kn, pm) such that the ICC (9) is
binding with no slack. Despite the fact that firms set the monopoly price during collusive
phases, the sum of firms’ equilibrium profits is below the monopoly profit, because punishment
phases occur on the equilibrium path. Finally, if firms set a collusive price below the monopoly
price, it not only lowers profits but it also raises the critical discount factor. Thus, either the
profile of trigger-sales strategies, with firms setting the monopoly price during collusive phases,
is a PPE or it is not an equilibrium strategy profile at any collusive price.
Next, we turn our attention to the case of perfect monitoring, where G (m⇤ (k1,m)) = 0.
In this case, any PPE is also a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) and, as we explain
further in a moment, we can easily generate the optimal SPNE profits by letting the punishment
phase last an infinite number of periods, such that T !1. Thus, the optimal SPNE profits are
summarised by the following corollary. We refer to this as collusion under perfect monitoring.
Corollary 1. For any given n   2 and K 1  m < m  x (k1), there exists a unique discount
factor  ⇤ (kn) ⌘ knK 2
 
0, mK
⇤
, such that if      ⇤ (kn), then firm i’s optimal SPNE profits under
trigger-sales strategies are:
kiV
⇤ =
ki
K
bm > ⇡Ni (kn) 8 i.
Otherwise, collusion under trigger-sales strategies is not sustainable.
The firms divide the monopoly profits between them if they are su ciently patient. The
equilibrium profits are highest and the critical discount factor is lowest when the firms set the
monopoly price. The critical discount factor is the same as in Compte et al. (2002) and it also
coincides with the lowest possible discount factor that sustains collusion given the proportional
allocation rule. The reason is that, as showed by Lambson (1994), the optimal punishments under
the proportional allocation rule are such that the largest firm receives the stream of profits from
its minimax strategy. In our setting, this is the case as T ! 1, because in each period of the
punishment phase the firms receive the static Nash equilibrium profits, which for the largest firm
is equivalent to its minimax payo↵. Thus, it is not possible to lower the critical discount factor
below this level, given the proportional allocation rule.
These results are brought together in Figure 1. It highlights that the critical discount factor
under imperfect monitoring,  ⇤ (k1, kn), converges to the critical level under perfect monitoring,
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Figure 1: Parameter space of collusion
 ⇤ (kn), at m = x (k1), but it is strictly above  ⇤ (kn) for any higher maximum market demand.
The optimal equilibrium profits under trigger-sales strategies, kiV ⇤, equal the monopoly level
at or below x (k1) for all      ⇤ (kn), and they equal the static Nash equilibrium profits at
m = x (k1, kn) where  ⇤ (k1, kn) = 1. Furthermore, assuming a mean-preserving spread, they are
strictly decreasing in m between x (k1) and x (k1, kn). Before moving on, the reader may wish
to check the online appendix, where we use the techniques of Abreu et al. (1986, 1990) to show
that the optimal equilibrium profits under trigger-sales strategies are the maximal PPE payo↵s.
Thus, henceforth we refer to them as the optimal equilibrium profits.
3.3 Comparing capacity distributions
We want to analyse the e↵ects of mergers in our setting. Before doing so, it is helpful to get
a clear understanding of how the capacity distribution a↵ects collusion by analysing changes in
the capacity distribution when the number of firms and the total capacity are held constant.
This implies that any such changes in the capacity of a given firm will require capacity to be
reallocated from a rival. For example, increasing the size of the smallest firm in a duopoly implies
that the capacity of the largest firm decreases. Thus, throughout this subsection, we assume
that when the capacity of firm j changes by a small amount, other things equal, the capacities
of the other firms change to the extent that @ki@kj 2 [ 1, 0] for all i 6= j, where
P
i 6=j
@ki
@kj
=  1.
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However, in what follows we restrict the discussion to capacity reallocations that directly a↵ect
the equilibrium analysis, and this is the case for changes to the capacity of the smallest firm or
the largest firm.
Proposition 3 analyses the e↵ects of reallocating capacity among the firms on the critical
discount factor, which ensures that the ICC holds as T !1.
Proposition 3. For any given n   2 and K 1  m < K:
i) if m 2 [m,x (k1)), then  ⇤ (kn) is strictly increasing in the capacity of the largest firm, kn;
ii) if m 2 [x (k1) , x (k1, kn)), then  ⇤ (k1, kn) is strictly increasing in the capacity of the largest
firm, kn, and strictly decreasing in the capacity of the smallest firm, k1.
Consistent with Compte et al. (2002), increasing the size of the largest firm hinders collusion.
The reason is that a punishment that lasts an infinite number of periods is weaker when the largest
firm is larger, because under Assumption 1 the static Nash equilibrium profits increase for each
firm, so the critical discount factor rises. In contrast to Compte et al. (2002), increasing the size
the smallest firm facilitates collusion. This is due to the fact that firms can monitor an agreement
more successfully when the smallest firm is larger, because it is less likely that firms’ sales will be
below their trigger levels when they set a common price. This does not a↵ect the critical discount
factor under perfect monitoring but, as we saw in section 3.1, it does imply that monitoring is
perfect for a wider range of fluctuations in market demand. Under imperfect monitoring, it is
less likely that a collusive phase will switch to a punishment phase on the equilibrium path when
the smallest firm is larger. Consequently, the expected future profits from collusion are higher
than before, which implies that a punishment that lasts an infinite number of periods is relatively
harsher, so the critical discount factor falls.12
Next, we analyse the e↵ects of reallocating capacity among the firms on the optimal equilib-
rium profits. For convenience, we transform such profits to an average price and compare it to
the average static Nash equilibrium price, given by bpN (kn) ⌘ Kbm (bm K n)kn for all m < K. The
average price of the optimal equilibrium profits under perfect monitoring is independent of the
capacity distribution, since firms set pm in each period if they are su ciently patient. So, Propo-
sition 4 investigates the e↵ect of reallocating capacity on the average price associated with the
12Both results are consistent with the findings of Vasconcelos (2005). The underlying incentives for his results
are very di↵erent to ours though, as they rely on capacities a↵ecting marginal costs in a setting of perfect
observability.
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optimal equilibrium profits under imperfect monitoring. We refer to this as the optimal average
price, and this is given by bpc (k1,m) ⌘ KbmV ⇤ in expectation, where bpN (kn) < bpc (k1,m) < pm.
Proposition 4. For any given n   2, K 1  m < x (k1) < m < x (k1, kn) and      ⇤ (k1, kn),
the optimal average price, bpc (k1,m), is strictly increasing in the capacity of the smallest firm,
k1.
The optimal average price is increasing in the capacity of the smallest firm for two reasons.
First, as the capacity of the smallest firm increases, it is less likely that firms’ sales will be below
their trigger levels when they set a common price. Thus, profits rise on the equilibrium path,
other things equal, because collusive phases are less likely to switch to punishment phases than
before. Second, such an increase in profits also introduces slack into the ICC. Consequently, the
optimal punishment phase duration shortens to ensure that the ICC is binding with no slack,
which increases equilibrium profits further.
Surprisingly, the optimal average price is independent of the capacity of the largest firm,
when the capacity of the smallest firm is held constant. This is due to the fact that an increase
in the capacity of the largest firm raises the static Nash equilibrium profits under Assumption 1,
and this causes two counteracting e↵ects on the collusive profits that perfectly o↵set each other.
First, there is a direct e↵ect in that higher static Nash equilibrium profits raise collusive profits
on the equilibrium path, other things equal. Second, higher static Nash equilibrium profits make
the punishment relatively weaker than before, so the ICC is tighter. Consequently, there is
indirect e↵ect in that profits on the equilibrium path fall, because the optimal punishment phase
duration lengthens to ensure that the ICC is binding with no slack. This second e↵ect cancels
out the first under the proportional allocation rule, implying the size of the largest firm has no
e↵ect on the optimal average price.
It follows from the above analysis that asymmetries hinder collusion under perfect and im-
perfect monitoring. In summary, Proposition 3 implies that the parameter space of collusion
is greatest when firms’ capacities are symmetric, because the punishment is harshest when the
largest firm is as small as possible, and since monitoring is most successful when the smallest firm
is as large as possible. The latter also implies that the optimal average price is higher if firms
are symmetric from Proposition 4. Furthermore, since the optimal average price is independent
of the size of the largest firm, it follows that the optimal average price is highest for a symmetric
duopoly and that, for example, it would be higher for a symmetric triopoly than an asymmetric
duopoly with k1 < K/3.
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Despite the fact that symmetry is ideal for collusion, Proposition 5 next shows that the
competitive prices of asymmetric capacity distributions can be higher on average than the optimal
collusive prices of less asymmetric capacity distributions. To prove this result, we compare the
optimal average price of one distribution, (k1, kn), to the static Nash equilibrium average price
of another, denoted (k01, k0n).
Proposition 5. For any given n   2, K 1  m < K and      ⇤ (k1, kn), if k0n > kn, such that
k01  k1, then there exists a unique level of market demand, x (k1, k0n) 2 (x (k1) , x (k1, kn)), that
solves G (m⇤ (k1, x (k1, k0n))) = 1   k
0
n
K < 1, where if m 2 (x (k1, k0n) , x (k1, kn)), then the static
Nash equilibrium average price of (k01, k0n) is strictly greater than the optimal average price of
(k1, kn), bpN (k0n) > bpc (k1,m).
This says that if fluctuations in market demand are su ciently large, then the competitive
prices of asymmetric capacity distributions are higher on average than the optimal collusive prices
of less asymmetric capacity distributions. The intuition is that an increase in the maximum
market demand raises the likelihood that firms’ sales will be below their trigger levels when
firms set a common price. Thus, punishment periods are expected to occur on the equilibrium
path more often than before. As a result, the optimal average price of (k1, kn) falls towards its
corresponding static Nash equilibrium average price as the maximum market demand increases
towards the critical level x (k1, kn). Yet, the average static Nash equilibrium price is strictly
increasing in the capacity of the largest firm, kn. So, consider an alternative distribution (k01, k0n)
that is more asymmetric than the original in the sense that k0n > kn (so k01  k1). It follows that
if the maximum market demand is su ciently close to x (k1, kn), then (k01, k0n) will have a higher
average static Nash equilibrium price than the optimal average price of (k1, kn). The critical
level x (k1, k0n) is the point at which bpc (k1,m) = bpN (k0n) for all      ⇤ (k1, kn). Furthermore, the
condition that the maximum market demand exceeds x (k1, k0n) guarantees that collusion under
trigger-sales strategies is not sustainable for (k01, k0n). This is due to the fact that collusion under
trigger-sales strategies requires that the maximum market demand is below x (k01, k0n) , but this
is contradicted since x (k01, k0n)  x (k1, k0n) < m for all k01  k1.
4 Monitoring and Mergers
We now use our equilibrium analysis to draw implications for merger policy. A merger in our
framework amounts to the merging firms consolidating their capacity, so we draw on the analysis
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of section 3.3. However, the following analysis di↵ers to section 3.3 in that a merger will reduce
the numbers of firms and can increase both the size of the smallest and largest firm at the same
time. We also consider the firms’ incentives to merge, analyse the welfare e↵ects, and discuss the
implications for divestment remedies. Following the terminology of Farrell and Shapiro (1990),
we henceforth refer to the merging firms as insiders and those not involved in the merger as
outsiders. We say that a merger is privately optimal if the sum of insiders’ profits post-merger
is strictly greater than the sum of their profits pre-merger. Finally, with respect to welfare,
we focus on the e↵ects of mergers on consumer surplus for two reasons. First, expected total
welfare is independent of the capacity distribution, so mergers do not a↵ect it. Second, ensuring
consumer surplus does not fall post-merger is commonly perceived to be the main objective of
merger control (see Lyons, 2002).
We are particularly interested in comparing unilateral and coordinated e↵ects in our frame-
work. Such e↵ects have been considered independently of each other in the previous literature.
For instance, Compte et al. (2002) and Vasconcelos (2005) analyse models where firms can op-
timally share the monopoly profits in every future period if collusion is sustainable, and they
both focus solely on the coordinated e↵ects of mergers on the critical discount factor. Bos and
Harrington (2010) analyse the coordinated e↵ects of mergers on the price of a cartel that does
not encompass all firms in the market. They find that mergers that increase the capacity con-
trolled by the cartel can raise the cartel price towards the monopoly level. However, in contrast
to our model, they restrict attention to capacity distributions for which there is a unique pure
strategy static Nash equilibrium price equal to marginal cost, so unilateral e↵ects are not an
issue. Thus, in each of these papers a merger that causes coordinated e↵ects is more harmful to
consumer welfare than compared with an alternative that causes unilateral e↵ects. This is not
always the case in our setting. The reason is that imperfect monitoring does not enable firms to
share the monopoly profits in every period, yet the static Nash equilibrium prices will be close
to the monopoly level when competition is weak. Consequently, a noncollusive merger outcome
that causes unilateral e↵ects can be worse for consumer welfare than a collusive outcome.
Before considering the e↵ects of mergers in our model, we return to discuss the generality of
Assumption 1 in the context of mergers. Recall that this restricts the smallest firm’s capacity
from being too small, m   K 1. In this context, the necessary condition for Assumption 1 to
hold is stricter than before, due to the fact that we are only interested in outcomes with at least
2 firms post-merger. Thus, there must be n > 2 firms pre-merger, in which case the minimum
market demand must be greater than n 1n of the total capacity, m  
 
n 1
n
 
K. The reason
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Figure 2: The e↵ects of mergers on the parameter space of collusion
is that the smallest firm’s capacity can be no larger pre-merger than for a symmetric capacity
distribution, k1 = K/n. This implies that Assumption 1 is more restrictive when there are more
firms in the market pre-merger. However, Assumption 1 is likely to hold for a large number
of mergers that raise concerns of collusion pre- and/or post-merger. For example, Davies et al.
(2011) found that the European Commission was concerned about post-merger collusion between
duopolists in all bar one of the cases that were seriously investigated for tacit collusion between
1990 and 2004 (see also Davies and Olczak, 2010). Consequently, there were usually only three
main players pre-merger, such that the necessary condition ism   23K. Moreover, given collusion
is likely to occur when asymmetries are small, Assumption 1 is especially unrestrictive for cases
in which there is collusion pre-merger.
Figure 2 builds on the illustration in Figure 1 to depict the e↵ects of mergers on the parameter
space of collusion. It shows how the equilibrium analysis is changed by a merger that either only
increases the size of the smallest firm or only increases the size of the largest firm. We discuss
each in turn. A merger that increases the size of both the smallest and the largest firm will have
a mix of the e↵ects described here. All other mergers will not a↵ect the equilibrium analysis.
A merger that only increases the size of the smallest firm will facilitate collusion. It follows
from Proposition 3 that the parameter space of collusion will expand and Proposition 4 implies
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that the average price may also rise post-merger. The parameter space for which such a merger
raises the average price is illustrated in the shaded area of Figure 2(a). It shows that the price will
rise if collusion is sustainable to some degree post-merger and if either the pre-merger outcome
is noncollusive or collusion pre-merger is less than perfect. Furthermore, similar to other models
where collusion pre-merger implies firms share the monopoly profits, such a merger has no e↵ect
on the average price if there is collusion under perfect monitoring pre- and post-merger. Any
such merger that raises the average price is privately optimal and it also strictly increases the
profits of the outsiders. This follows since the present discounted value of profits for any set of
firms M , given an average price bp, is Pi2M ki bmK ⇣ bp1  ⌘, where this is higher post-merger only
if the average price rises. As a consequence, such a merger will also lower consumer surplus,
since the expected consumer surplus per unit is 1   bp. Thus, any collusive outcome that has
been facilitated by a merger that only increases the size of the smallest firm is worse than the
pre-merger outcome.13
A merger that only increases the size of the largest firm will hinder collusion. Proposition 3
implies that the parameter space of collusion will contract. Yet, it follows from Proposition 5 that
such a merger may actually increase prices through unilateral e↵ects even if there is collusion pre-
merger. The parameter space for which such a merger raises the average price is illustrated in the
shaded area of Figure 2(b). It shows that prices will rise if collusion under imperfect monitoring is
sustainable pre-merger but not post-merger and if fluctuations in market demand are su ciently
large. Prices fall for the rest of the area where collusion under imperfect monitoring is sustainable
pre-merger but not post-merger. Nevertheless, our model suggests that it is only in the insiders’
interests to merge when the average price rises post-merger. This follows since such a merger
is privately optimal for any set of firms M if
P
i2M ki
bm
K
✓ bpN(k0n)
1  
◆
>
P
i2M ki
bm
K
⇣ bpc(k1,m)
1  
⌘
.
Consequently, the condition that guarantees the insiders’ profits increase post-merger also ensures
that the average price rises post-merger. Moreover, the same condition also guarantees that such
a merger increases the profits of the outsiders and lowers consumer surplus. It should also be
noted for completeness that if there is no collusion pre- or post-merger, then such a merger would
increase the average price post-merger through unilateral e↵ects.
Finally, our analysis has important implications for the appropriate divestment remedies of
anti-competitive mergers. For instance, an implication of Proposition 5 is that the unilateral
13It also follows from this that larger firms i > 1 may increase their profits by divesting capacity to the smallest
firm, so that monitoring is easier. Such divestments are not unheard of in actual merger cases (see Compte et al.,
2002; and Davies and Olczak, 2010).
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e↵ects of a merger can be remedied by a divestment that creates a collusive symmetric outcome.
Such a remedy would commonly be rejected by a competition agency, as was the case in the
Nestle´/Perrier merger analysed by Compte et al. (2002), for example. To illustrate that such a
remedy could eliminate the unilateral e↵ects of a merger, consider a scenario where pre-merger
there is a noncollusive triopoly with a capacity distribution of (k1, k3). Suppose the two largest
firms propose to merge and that this would create an asymmetric duopoly (k1, k02), where k02 > k3
such that prices will rise through unilateral e↵ects. Consider a remedy of such unilateral e↵ects
whereby the merged entity divests some of its capacity to the outsider to create a symmetric
duopoly (k, k), where k02 > k > k1. Proposition 5 implies that if the maximum market demand
is su ciently close to x (k, k), then the collusive symmetric duopoly (k, k) will have lower prices
and hence higher consumer surplus than the noncollusive unremedied duopoly (k1, k02), since
limm!x(k,k)bpc (k,m) = bpN (k) < bpN (k02) for all k02 > k. Thus, here the collusive symmetric
duopoly should be preferred to the unremedied post-merger outcome (k1, k02) from a consumer
welfare perspective. Furthermore, similar logic implies that if the largest firm pre-merger has
more capacity than in the collusive symmetric duopoly, k3 > k, then such a divestment can even
lower prices compared to pre-merger. In such a case, the collusive symmetric duopoly should
actually be preferred to the pre-merger status quo.
5 Concluding remarks
We have explored the e↵ects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion in a setting
where there is demand uncertainty and where firms never directly observe their rivals’ prices
and sales. Despite the fact that each firm must monitor the collusive agreement using their
privately observed prices and sales, we have shown that firms can perfectly detect deviations if
demand fluctuations are su ciently small. Otherwise, monitoring is imperfect and punishment
phases occur on the equilibrium path. Consistent with the previous literature, we found that
asymmetries hinder collusion. Yet, we also analysed both the unilateral and coordinated e↵ects
of mergers in a unified framework. We showed that if demand fluctuations are su ciently large,
then the (average) competitive prices of asymmetric capacity distributions are actually higher
than the optimal (average) collusive prices of less asymmetric capacity distributions.
Our results have three main implications for merger policy. First, although market trans-
parency is rightly an important criterion in the assessment of coordinated e↵ects in practice,
our model re-emphasises the fact that a lack of transparency about rivals’ prices and sales is
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not a su cient condition to rule out such e↵ects: firms may be able to monitor a collusive
agreement using their private information. Second, while the possible e↵ects of imperfect moni-
toring are explicitly mentioned in general terms in the most recent US and European horizontal
merger guidelines, our model suggests that such monitoring will be di cult in markets where
firm asymmetries are large. Third, and most importantly, collusive merger outcomes should not
be presumed to be more harmful than more asymmetric noncollusive merger outcomes. A collu-
sive agreement may require su ciently frequent price wars that actually lead to higher consumer
surplus than a more asymmetric outcome in which one firm’s market power is strengthened uni-
laterally. Consequently, it can be appropriate to remedy a merger outcome with a singularly
dominant firm by imposing a divestment that creates a symmetric market structure, even if this
facilitates collusion under imperfect monitoring. Likewise, it can be inappropriate for a competi-
tion authority to remedy a collusive post-merger outcome by imposing a divestment that creates
a more asymmetric market structure.
Finally, an important avenue for future research is to develop techniques that can assess
accurately in practice whether a collusive merger outcome is better than a noncollusive outcome.
We believe that there are two existing methodologies that are a good place to start to address this
issue. First, if collusion is expected to be facilitated post-merger, then more advanced merger
simulation techniques may enable the likely e↵ects to be simulated. While these techniques
have been criticised in the past for not allowing the conduct of firms post-merger to di↵er
from that assumed pre-merger (see Whinston, 2007), recent developments have have gone some
way to address this. For example, Davis and Huse (2010) and Ivaldi and Lagos (2016) use
the standard simulation methodology of unilateral e↵ects to develop empirical techniques that
simulate coordinated e↵ects on the critical discount factor in di↵erentiated goods market under
perfect observability. Thus, to be applicable to the current context, these techniques would have
to be extended to the case of imperfect monitoring. Second, if the pre-merger status quo is
thought to be collusive, then it may be possible to use the screening devices for collusion on pre-
merger data to estimate the extent to which such collusion is imperfect (see Harrington, 2008,
for a review of these devices). For example, one such technique, developed by Porter (1983) and
Ellison (1994), discovers collusion under imperfect monitoring by finding evidence of price wars
(that is, abrupt changes in prices that cannot be explained by fluctuations in cost or demand).
Such price wars are inconsistent with models of competition and with perfect collusion, so if
there is no evidence of them pre-merger (and price is at or near the monopoly level), then it is
likely that welfare will be improved if collusion pre-merger is expected to be destabilised post-
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merger. On the other hand, evidence of frequent or long price wars pre-merger could suggest
that collusion is su ciently imperfect pre-merger that destabilising collusion by enhancing the
market power of one firm unilaterally will actually harm welfare.
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Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 1. There exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium if m   K, where
⇡Ni = ki 8 i. This follows from ⇡i(pi,p i) = piki 8 pi  1, so the best reply of firm i is pi = 1 for
any p i, 8 i. There is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium if m < K. To see this, note that any
such candidate equilibrium requires pj = p 8 j. Otherwise, firm i 2 ⌦ (pmax) has an incentive to
increase its price towards pmax, from ⇡i (pi,p i) = piki 8 pi < pmax. However, for any p 2 (0, 1],
firm i has an incentive to lower its price, since ⇡i(p   ✏, p) > ⇡i(p) if m < K, where ✏ > 0 but
small. Moreover, for p = 0, firm i has an incentive to raise its price, since Assumption 1 ensures
⇡i(✏, 0) > 0 8 i.
Nevertheless, if K > m   K 1, the existence of a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is guaran-
teed by Thereom 1 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). To characterise this equilibrium, let Hi(p)
denote the probability that firm i charges a price less than or equal to p. Below we demonstrate
that the equilibrium profits are given by (2) for all i and that:
Hi(p) =
1
ki
24 (⇡n   pkn)
pkn
⇣Rmin{K,m}
m (m K) g (m) dm
⌘ nY
j=1
kj
351/(n 1) , (12)
where ⇡n is as given in (3). This converges to the analysis in Fonseca and Normann (2008) as
m! m.
In equilibrium, firm i must receive the following expected profit from charging p  1:
p
0@Y
j 6=i
Hj(p)⇡i +
0@1 Y
j 6=i
Hj(p)
1A ki
1A = ki
kn
⇡n, 8 i (13)
where
Q
j 6=iHj(p) is the probability that firm i is the highest-priced firm. To solve for the right-
hand side of (13), notice firm i has no incentive to price below ⇡i/ki ⌘ pi, where pn   pn 1  
. . .   p
1
. Moreover, any firm j < n can guarantee profits of kjkn⇡n   ⇡j by charging a price
marginally below p
n
, so all firms have no incentive to price below p
n
. Finally, the fact that all
firms j < n place positive probability on charging p
n
is necessary and su cient to ensure p
n
is
also the lowest price that firm n will charge. Thus, the lower bound of Hi(p) is p = pn = ⇡n/kn
8 i. Manipulating (13) yields:
Hi(p) =
pkn (⇡i   ki)
⇡n   pkn
Y
j
Hj(p)
1
ki
. (14)
Noting that ⇡i   ki =
Rmin{K,m}
m (m K) g (m) dm 8 i for any K > m from (3), it follows from
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(14) that:
Y
j
Hj(p) =
24pkn
⇣Rmin{K,m}
m (m K) g (m) dm
⌘
⇡n   pkn
Y
j
Hj(p)
35n nY
l=1
✓
1
kl
◆
.
Thus, solving for
Q
j Hj(p) and substituting into (14) shows that Hi(p) is as claimed in (12).
It follows from (12) that Hi(1) Q 1 if k
n 1
iQ
j 6=n kj
R 1. This has two implications. First, if
kn 1iQ
j 6=n kj
  1, then firm i randomises over ⇥p, 1⇤ and puts mass of 1 Hi(1) on a price of 1 when
the inequality is strict. Note that
kn 1iQ
j 6=n kj
> 1 never holds if ki = k 8 i but always holds for firm
n if kn > k1. Second, if
kn 1iQ
j 6=n kj
< 1 for some i < n, then firm i randomises over
⇥
p, pi
⇤
where
pi < 1 solves Hi (pi) = 1. Consequently, the probability distributions of the larger firms with
higher upper bounds must be adjusted accordingly. For example, if pi < 1 only for firm 1 (which
is the case for any triopoly with k1 < k2), then the largest n  1 firms play with Hi(p) adjusted
so that n  1 replaces n over [p1, 1]. Note that k
n 1
iQ
j 6=n kj
< 1 never holds if n = 2 or if ki = k 8 i
for any n   2. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 1. There can be perfect monitoring if m > m⇤ (k1,m) and there is imperfect
monitoring otherwise. Note that ifm   K, then there is never perfect monitoring for anym < K,
since then m⇤ (k1,m) = K. So, consider the case of m < K where m⇤ (k1,m) =
K(m k1)
K 1 .
Substituting this into m > m⇤ (k1,m) and rearranging yields m < m + k1
⇣
K m
K
⌘
⌘ x (k1),
where x (k1) 2 (m,K) for any m < K. Thus, it follows that monitoring can be perfect if
m < x (k1), as this implies m > m⇤ (k1,m). Otherwise, there is imperfect monitoring. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 2. Given kiV c in (7) is strictly decreasing in T , the optimal equilibrium
profits for firm i can be found by evaluating it at T ⇤ (k1, kn, pc). Thus, it follows from (9) that:
1   T⇤ = (1   ) (K   bm) pc
 
⇥
(1 G (m⇤ (k1,m)))K
 
pc   p   (K   bm) pc⇤ . (15)
Then, substituting this into (7) yields:
kiV
c =
ki
K
✓ bm G (m⇤ (k1,m))K
1 G (m⇤ (k1,m))
◆
pc, 8 i.
This is strictly increasing in pc, so pc = 1 and kiV ⇤ is as claimed. Substituting pc = 1 into (10)
and (11) yields:
    1
1 G (m⇤ (k1,m))
kn
K
⌘  ⇤ (k1, kn)
and
G (m⇤ (k1,m)) <
K n
K
,
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respectively. Furthermore, note that  ⇤ (k1, kn, pc) is strictly decreasing in pc, such that collusion
under trigger-sales strategies is not sustainable for any   <  ⇤ (k1, kn) for any pc  1. Finally, it
follows from @G(m
⇤)
@m > 0 for all m < K that there is a unique level of m, denoted x (k1, kn), that
sets G (m⇤ (k1,m)) =
K n
K < 1, where x (k1, kn) < K and where G (m
⇤ (k1,m)) 2
⇣
0, K nK
⌘
for
all m 2 [x (k1) , x (k1, kn)). This implies  ⇤ (k1, kn) 2
 
kn
K , 1
 
and kiV ⇤ 2
 
⇡Ni (kn) , ki
bm
K
 
for all
m 2 [x (k1) , x (k1, kn)). ⌅
Proof of Proposition 3. Di↵erentiating  ⇤ (k1, kn) = 1(1 G(m⇤(k1,m)))
kn
K with respect to kj yields:
@ ⇤
@kj
=
1
K [1 G (m⇤)]

@kn
@kj
+ kn
g (m⇤)
1 G (m⇤)
@m⇤
@k1
@k1
@kj
 
.
Thus, @ 
⇤
@k1
< 0 from @kn@k1 2 [ 1, 0], @m
⇤
@k1
< 0 for all m < K and @k1@k1 = 1. Furthermore,
@ ⇤
@kn
> 0
from @kn@kn = 1,
@m⇤
@k1
< 0 for all m < K and @k1@kn 2 [ 1, 0]. Finally,  ⇤ (kn) = knK implies
@ ⇤
@kn
> 0.
⌅
Proof of Proposition 4. Di↵erentiating bpc (k1,m) = KbmV ⇤ with respect to kj yields:
@bpc
@kj
=
Kbm @V ⇤@kj =   (K   bm) g (m⇤)bm (1 G(m⇤))2 @m⇤@k1 @k1@kj .
Thus, @bpc@k1 > 0 from 0 < bm < m < K, @m⇤@k1 < 0 for all m < K and @k1@k1 = 1. ⌅
Proof of Proposition 5. We first show that bpN (k0n, bm) > bpc (k1,m) if m > x (k1, k0n) . This
follows since bpN (k0n, bm) > bpc (k1,m) if G (m⇤ (k1,m)) > 1   k0nK . Furthermore, in Proposition
2, x (k1, kn) is defined as the level of m that solves G (m⇤ (k1, x (k1, kn))) = 1   knK . Thus,
x (k1, k0n) is the level that solves G (m⇤ (k1, x (k1, k0n))) = 1  k
0
n
K where x (k1, k
0
n) > x (k1). This
and @G(m
⇤)
@m > 0 implies that if m > x (k1, k
0
n), such that G (m
⇤ (k1, x (k1, kn))) > 1   k
0
n
K , thenbpN (k0n, bm) > bpc (k1,m).
Next, note that this comparison is only meaningful ifm < x (k1, kn) and if      ⇤ (k1, kn) such
that bpc (k1,m) is an equilibrium average price. So, we next show that x (k1, k0n) < x (k1, kn) if
k0n > kn such that k01  k1. Using the implicit function theorem on Z ⌘ 1  knK  G (m⇤ (k1,m)) =
0 yields:
@x
@kj
=  
@Z
@kj
@Z
@m
=   1 
g (m⇤) @m⇤@m
  ✓ 1
K
@kn
@kj
+ g (m⇤)
@m⇤
@k1
@k1
@kj
◆
.
It follows from this that @x@kn < 0, since for all m < K,
@m⇤
@m > 0,
@kn
@kn
= 1, @m
⇤
@k1
< 0 and
@k1
@kn
2 [ 1, 0]. So, if k0n > kn, then x (k1, k0n) < x (k1, kn).
Thus, the above implies that, for any      ⇤ (k1, kn), if k0n > kn (so k01  k1), then there
exists a unique x (k1, k0n) 2 (x (k1) , x (k1, kn)) such that if x (k1, k0n) < m < x (k1, kn), then
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bpN (k0n) > bpc (k1,m). Finally, notice that if x (k1, k0n) < m < x (k1, kn), then x (k01, k0n) < m
from k01  k1 and @x@k1 > 0. Consequently, it follows from Proposition 2 that collusion under
trigger-sales strategies is not sustainable for (k01, k0n). ⌅
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